CHAPTER 3: FINANCE

3:10 Accounting

R. v. Fast, 2014 CarswellSask 201 (Sask. Q.B.)

Crown Expert: Douglas Kalesnikoff

Fast and his daughter Fast-Carlson were charged with fraud, making false statements and possession of proceeds of crime. At the start of the trial, Fast entered pleas of guilt on all three counts. The trial proceeded solely against Fast-Carlson. The facts were succinctly summarized by the Court as follows:

This case is about unscrupulous business practices, criminal schemes to make money, greed, and human nature. The defendants, father and daughter, were involved in a business known as Marathon Leasing Corporation. It is alleged that they defrauded investors by operating the business as a Ponzi scheme, paying interest to initial investors out of new investment capital rather than from operating funds or profits. For their part, the investors were often all too eager to obtain high rates of returns on investment, sometimes blinding themselves to the risks, sometimes even investing their entire retirement savings and losing most of it in pursuit of a high-yield investment that sounded too good to be true — and, for many, was. [para. 1]

Mr Kalesnikoff was qualified as an expert witness and permitted to provide expert opinion evidence on the topic of forensic accounting. The Court described his qualifications as follows:

Mr. Kalesnikoff holds designations as a chartered accountant and an investigative forensic accountant. He is presently an associate professor at the Edwards School of Business, University of Saskatchewan, and remains in private practice. He has been engaged as an investigative forensic accountant on over 500 civil matters and numerous criminal investigations and has served as lead investigator on some of those matters. His expertise has been sought by foreign nations. He has appeared as an expert witness before some 40 Canadian courts, boards and tribunals. The defence took no issue with qualifying Mr. Kalesnikoff as an expert. [para. 6]

Mr Kalesnikoff was the primary author of a report which was tendered at trial. The report was referred to as the “Grant Thornton Report.” The report set out an “analysis of the activities of the corporations and individuals involved in the transactions impugned by the Crown.” [para. 7]

Mr Kalesnikoff’s evidence and report were extremely detailed and it was:

Mr. Kalesnikoff’s professional opinion that Marathon was a scheme used to defraud investors out of their money. There was no way that Marathon would ever be able to pay them back what they owed. That should have been readily apparent to management at Marathon. [para. 36]

In accepting that evidence the Court noted that:

Mr. Kalesnikoff’s qualifications, testimony and professional opinions and conclusions were not challenged in any meaningful way by the defence on cross-examination. After a careful review of his report and the source documents behind same, the court has accepted his testimony and professional opinions, and has put significant weight on same. [para. 36]

Fast-Carlson was convicted of two of the three counts before the court. [para. 341]

R. v. Trac, 2013 CarswellOnt 4582 (Ont. C.A.)

Crown Expert: Mr. Coort

Trac was convicted of several drug related offences and sentenced accordingly. The Crown appealed on two grounds. First, that the custodial portion of the sentence should be increased — this ground of appeal was later abandoned. Second, that the order revoking a restraining order in respect of certain assets and returning the assets to the owners, including Trac, was in error and a new forfeiture hearing should be held.

Trac sought leave to appeal and if granted sound that the fine in lieu of forfeiture was made in error.

The ground of appeal about the forfeiture hearing dealt with the expert evidence marshalled at trial.

The facts were summarized by the Court of Appeal as follows:

. . . [t]he respondent was a central participant in a multi-million dollar marihuana growing scheme that operated between September 2000 and December 2002 out of dozens of residences in the Toronto area. The residences had been rented under false pretences and used to house large scale marihuana growing operations (“grow ops”). The respondent was arrested in December 2002 and a restraining order was made under s. 462.33 freezing various assets allegedly connected to the respondent. [para. 7]

A forfeiture application was brought by the Crown seeking:

. . . forfeiture of cash, three real properties, and numerous bank accounts. The trial judge declined to make the forfeiture order requested by the Crown. He did, however, invoke s. 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code and ordered the respondent to pay a fine of $760,000 in lieu of forfeiture.

The judged declined to make the order sought and “ordered the various assets returned to their owners.” [para. 14]

The Crown position on the forfeiture appeal was described as follows:

. . . the trial judge erred in law in his interpretation of the forfeiture provisions in the Criminal Code, misapprehended relevant evidence and failed to consider relevant evidence. The Crown contends that the trial judge refused to make a forfeiture order because the Crown’s forensic accountant could not say that any specific asset the Crown wanted forfeited was traceable in its entirety to cash generated by the respondent’s drug trafficking. The Crown submits that this approach reads too narrowly the forfeiture powers in the Criminal Code, ignores the money laundering conviction, and fails to consider the entirety of the evidence. [para. 52]

Mr. Coort was qualified as an expert in forensic accounting. The Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge “accepted that the Crown’s expert had examined the accounts used by the respondent to launder the proceeds of his criminal activities, but that he could not adequately trace cash deposits through to the assets that the Crown wanted forfeited.” [para. 71]

Ultimately the Court agreed with the Crown and agreed:

. . . with Crown counsel that the trial judge’s finding that none of the assets were the “proceeds of crime” turned entirely on the expert’s inability to say that any given asset was the “proceeds of crime”. I think it was unreasonable to expect that kind of evidence from the expert. The expert could identify indicia associated with the “proceeds of crime” and could speak to probabilities with respect to particular assets. It was for the trial judge, on the basis of the expert evidence and the rest of the evidence, especially the admissions, to decide whether the Crown had proved that any particular asset was the “proceeds of crime”. [para. 101]

The Court concluded that a new forfeiture hearing could be held and that “neither the trial judge’s factual findings, nor his interpretation of the relevant provisions, will be binding on the judge conducting the new forfeiture hearing.” [para. 104]

R. v. Khan, 2014 CarswellOnt 19033 (Ont. S.C.J.)

Crown Expert: Scott McBride

Khan and Muellenback were jointly charged with a number of forgery-related offences, money laundering and income tax fraud.

The facts briefly were described by Code J., the pre-trial motions judge as follows:

The facts of the case, in brief summary, are that Khan and Muellenbach were allegedly the directing minds behind a business known as Flash Jack, located in a building at 361 Yonge Street in downtown Toronto. The building was owned by their family. There is no serious dispute that false identification was being produced and sold through Flash Jack. The first live issue in the case is whether that false identification is a “false document”, within the meaning of s. 366 and, if so, whether those responsible for making and selling it had the requisite intent that it be “used or acted on as genuine”. The defence, in this regard, is that the false identification was a mere “novelty” item. See: R. v. Sommani (2007), 218 C.C.C. (3d) 168 (B.C. C.A.). The second live issue in the case is whether Khan and Muellenbach were mere owners and landlords of the building and had no involvement in any illegal activities carried on by their tenants. The police investigation of the forgery-related offences developed into a tax fraud and money-laundering investigation, as the police tried to discover the identity of the directing minds behind the businesses operating out of 361 Yonge Street. [para. 2]

One of the pretrial motions heard by Code J. was the scope of the expert evidence. At the preliminary inquiry Mr. McBride’s report was filed but the expert did not testify. At trial the Crown indicated that it was seeking to both file the report and call viva voce evidence.

Khan conceded that this body of expert evidence was admissible but argued that its admissibility was limited to forgery related offences. “In relation to the tax fraud and money-laundering offences, they submitted that the accounting evidence is more prejudicial than probative and that it ought to be excluded pursuant to the second stage “gatekeeper” function described in R. v. Abbey (2009), 246 C.C.C. (3d) 301 (Ont. C.A.).” [para. 90]

The Court summarized the defence argument as follows:

Mr. Slansky’s argument, to the effect that the accounting evidence is not admissible on the tax fraud and money-laundering counts in the Indictment, turns on a narrow point. He submits that the accounting evidence does no more than show gross revenue or credits flowing into the five bank accounts, and that the revenue or credits in these accounts was arguably being used for Khan’s and Muellenbach’s benefit. He conceded that this evidence is relevant to the tax fraud counts, in the sense that gross revenue is the first step in analyzing whether net income is being earned and whether tax is being evaded. However, he submitted that the accountant’s report makes no effort to calculate business expenses that could be deducted against these gross revenues, no effort to calculate net income, and no effort to calculate tax owing. In short, he submitted, the report conflates gross revenue with tax owing. This approach to tax fraud, and the related laundering of proceeds of tax fraud, is both minimally probative and highly prejudicial in Mr. Slansky’s submission. [para. 95]

The Court did not accept this argument and explained that:

. . . the flaw in this argument is that it places the entire burden of the Crown’s case, in relation to the tax fraud and money-laundering counts, on the accounting evidence. As with the forgery-related offences, the accounting evidence must be assessed together with all the other evidence. [para. 96]

Code J. was satisfied that:

. . . totality of the anticipated evidence, including the accounting evidence, could give rise to the following reasonable inferences: large amounts of money that appeared to belong to Khan and Muellenbach were being processed through five nominee accounts; at least some parts of the businesses at 361 Yonge Street, including the false identification business, were lucrative and were generating profits; some of these businesses, including the false identification business, appeared to be under Khan and Muellenbach’s control; no business income was being declared by Khan or Muellenbach (or, apparently, by Mumtaz Khan, prior to her death); no Statement of Business Income and Expenses was being filed with the C.R.A. by anyone in relation to the large amounts of money moving through the five accounts or in relation to the apparently lucrative proceeds of the false identification business; the elaborate scheme of using and changing five rotating nominee accounts, together with the failure to file any Statement of Business Income and Expenses, tends to infer that at least some net income was being hidden as there would be no reason to hide businesses and their bank accounts, if the businesses were running at a loss. It will be open to the trier of fact, on all this evidence, to infer that tax was being evaded. At a minimum, there is evidence of “deprivation”, as that term is understood in the law of fraud. The accounting evidence is an essential part of this circumstantial web and there is no basis on which it can or should be excluded. [para. 99]

R. v. Duffy, 2015 CarswellOnt 18781 (Ont. C.J.)

Crown Expert: Mark Grenon

Michael Duffy was charged with various offences related to alleged fraudulent expense claims and misrepresentations related to his work as a Senator. As part of its case, the Crown sought to tender the evidence of Mark Grenon, who conducted a forensic accounting of the expense claims of Duffy. In particular, the Crown sought to qualify Grenon to give expert opinion evidence in relation to his analysis of the following areas:

(i)    The travel claims submitted by Senator Duffy and paid by the Senate;

(ii)   Senator Duffy’s financial practices and position;

(iii)  Senate contract funds procured and distributed by Senator Duffy and Gerald Donohue; and

(iv)  The payment of $90,000 by Nigel Wright to Senator Duffy to the Receiver General of Canada.

The defence did not object to the evidence as it related to point (iv) nor did it object to the admissibility of the evidence related to point (i), with some qualification of the scope of that area. The defence did object to the evidence as it related to points (ii) and (iii).

In considering the admissibility of this evidence the court cited and relied upon R. v. Mohan, 1994 CarswellOnt 66 (S.C.C.), White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 CarswellNS 313 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Abbey, 2009 CarswellOnt 5008 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused 2010 CarswellOnt 4827, 2010 CarswellOnt 4828 (S.C.C.). In doing so, the court recognized the test for admissibility laid down in Mohan, the need for an impartial expert, as discussed in White and the gatekeeper role to be played by the court.

Turning to the evidence before it, inter alia, the court ruled on necessity. In this context, the court accepted the Crown’s position that this evidence, and the work done by Grenon, was “a task that is likely outside the experience and knowledge of a layperson”; this position was based in part on the “sheer volume of work” and the “skill and expertise employed” [para. 111]. In so finding, the court noted that the evidence is more than just helpful, it was necessary. The court also ruled on the “properly qualified expert” head of the test. In this context, the court noted that the defence did not challenge Grenon on his qualifications, but did challenge his impartiality. The court rejected this challenge and found that Grenon, who was “unequivocal as to his duty to the court to give fair, objective and non-partisan evidence regardless of the party retaining his services” was impartial and complied with those requirements.

R. v. Tang, 2015 CarswellOnt 9470 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused 2016 CarswellOnt 5402, 2016 CarswellOnt 5403 (S.C.C.)

Crown Expert: Deverteuil

Tang was convicted of a multi-million dollar fraud arising out of an investment scheme. Tang appealed both conviction and sentence. Tang represented himself at trial with the assistance of amicus. One of the grounds of appeal was that Mr. Deverteuil should not have been permitted to given expert evidence because he lacked sufficient independence and impartiality.

The initial investigation into Tang began with the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC). Mr. Deverteuil is employed by the OSC and actively involved in the investigation.

The Court of Appeal held that:

Mr. Deverteuil’s connection with the OSC and its investigation of Mr. Tang did not automatically disqualify him from giving any and all expert forensic accounting evidence in the criminal proceeding. We do not read White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23 (S.C.C.) as establishing that kind of per se rule. The determination of whether an expert’s prior connection with an investigation should disqualify that person from giving expert opinion evidence can only be made within the full context of the specific facts. The nature of the prior investigation, the role played by the individual expert in that investigation, and the nature of the proposed expert evidence would all be important considerations in the determination of whether the expert’s prior involvement made the case was one of those relatively rare cases in which an expert’s lack of independence or impartiality provided a basis for holding that the expert was not competent to testify. As Burgess indicates, in most cases, suggestions that an expert witness lacks independence or impartiality will go to the weight of the expert’s evidence rather than its admissibility. [at para. 6]

Moreover, the Court explained that in this case Mr. Deverteuil’s evidence was primarily factual and not opinion evidence. It dealt almost entirely with the tracing of funds in and out of accounts. [at para. 5] As such, even if his involvement in the OSC investigation disqualified him from giving opinion evidence, “his evidence racing the funds remained admissible.” [at para. 7]

3:20 Banking

R. v. Colpitts, 2016 CarswellNS 688 (N.S. S.C.)

Crown Expert: Langley Evans

Colpitts and Potter were charged with a number of fraud related offences. Potter was President/CEO of Knowledge House Incorporated (KHI) and Colpitts was legal counsel for the company. Both were alleged to have acted fraudulently to affect the public market price of shares of the KHI.

The Crown sought to have Mr. Evans qualified as an expert capable of providing:

. . . opinion evidence related to the analysis and interpretation of stock market trading practices and techniques utilized to artificially affect and/or maintain the price of publically-traded shares and, in particular, has conducted an analysis of the trading practices involving the shares of Knowledge House Incorporated. [para. 3]

Counsel for Potter and Colpitts opposed the Crown application arguing that Mr. Evans was not a properly qualified expert.

The Court found that the proposed evidence was relevant and necessary and further that there was no exclusionary rule. The real point of contention on the application was whether Mr. Evans was a properly qualified expert. The defence argument on this point was that:

Mr. Evans’ opinions are not based entirely on his own work. They argue that his methodology is flawed and that he failed to consider materials they view as essential to his opinions. The Defendants argue that he failed to independently investigate and adopted the materials and theories of the RCMP without question. They accuse him of tunnel vision and suggest he has become an advocate for the Crown. They argue his opinions are not reliable and, as such, are of no assistance to the trier of fact. [para. 11]

The Court rejected these arguments and Coady J. held that he would:

. . . not be excluding any aspect of Mr. Evans’ proposed evidence at the preliminary stage. I am satisfied that the element of relevance has been met and there is no exclusionary rule at play. I have received submissions, supported by documentary evidence, that question the necessity element. The Defendants argue that Mr. Evans’ methodology is so flawed that I cannot rely on it. I do not find that these submissions warrant rejection of his proposed evidence. [para. 16]

In cross-examination on the application, Mr. Evans conceded some errors in his calculations and explained why his proposed testimony was not materially affected by these errors. The court accepted this evidence and noted that while Mr. Evans’ evidence:

. . . is not perfect and more issues may arise as Mr. Evans gives his trial evidence. However, any such concerns will go to weight. [para. 35]

The Court also rejected the defence claim that Mr. Evans report and proposed evidence were not the product of independent analysis and “totally unreliable.” Coady J. held that:

It is my conclusion the Defendants have failed to establish that Mr. Evans is not a properly qualified expert based on his impartiality. He came to the KHI task with little knowledge of the background. It is the role of all proposed experts to seek instructions from a party to the litigation. These types of contact do not equate to evidence of bias sufficient to finding the opinions inadmissible. [para. 33]

Lastly with respect to the challenge to Mr Evans’ impartiality the Court saw:

. . . nothing to support the Defendants’ view that Mr. Evans exercised tunnel vision or is in the pockets of the RCMP. No doubt there will be challenges to Mr. Evans’ impartiality during this trial, but they are not significant enough to displace his assertion that he is an independent expert well aware of his foremost obligation to the Court. [para. 34]

R. v. Solleveld, 2014 CarswellOnt 6644 (Ont. C.A.)

Crown Expert: James Byrne

Robert and Denise Solleveld (the Sollevelds) and Cranston where each convicted of a variety of fraud related offences. The three were found guilty of running a high yield investment scheme that attracted millions of dollars from ‘investors’. [at paras. 2-3]

They appealed convictions and sentence. They argued, among other things, that the trial judge erred in admitting the expert evidence of Mr. Byrne. Mr. Byrne was qualified as an expert in international banking practices and high yield fraud. He testified about:

•    normal banking practices

•    the hallmarks of high yield frauds with specific reference to:

o     unrealistically high returns

o     the need for secrecy

o     the exploitation of religious or cultural affiliations

o     the lack of clear and professional approach to trading [at para. 8]

Mr. Byrne examined “the documents and methods used by the appellants to attract investors in their scheme and testified that those documents were similar to and bore the hallmarks of a high yield investment fraud.” [at para. 8]

The appellants argued that this type of evidence amounted to profiling and usurps the role of the jury on the issue of intent. The Court of Appeal soundly rejected these arguments. The Court held:

The admission of Byrne’s evidence met the four criteria set out in R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 (S.C.C.): i) relevance, ii) necessity in assisting the trier of fact, iii) the absence of any exclusionary rule, and iv) a properly qualified expert. The appellants do not challenge the qualification of Professor Byrne, nor are there any applicable exclusionary rules. The evidence as to the nature and character of the methods and documents used by the appellants was plainly relevant to the issue of whether or not their investment scheme was a fraudulent scam. In our view, the evidence was also necessary given the inherent complexity of international banking and the esoteric nature of documents used by the appellants to attract investors. International banking practices and purportedly sophisticated and obscure investments of the kind used by the appellants are not matters within the knowledge and experience of the ordinary juror. Professor Byrne had specialist knowledge that could assist the trier of fact in understanding the obscure terminology and jargon of the financial world.

Professor Byrne’s analysis of the document and methods used by the appellants did not, as in Sekhon, depend for its relevance on “the guilt or innocence of accused persons that [the witness] had encountered in the past” but rather upon Byrne’s expert knowledge of international banking and the types of documents that are properly and improperly used in that highly specialized sphere of activity. [at paras. 15-16]

3:30 Fraud and Forgery

R. v. Jahanrakhshan, 2013 CarswellBC 1074 (B.C. C.A.)

Crown Expert: Sgt. Richard Koop

Jahanrakhshan was arrested for interfering with a police investigation. Upon his arrest he was in possession of a credit card that appeared forged. [at paras. 1-2]. Following a trial on a 20-count indictment which included charges of obstruct and credit card forgery, Jahanrakshan was convicted of numerous counts including the forgery offences. He appealed. In relation to the forgery count, Jahanrakhshan argued that the trial judge misapprehended the expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground of appeal and held that:

The appellant’s contention that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence arises from an exaggerated view of the effectiveness of the cross-examination of Sgt. Koop. While Sgt. Koop agreed that by introducing certain errors in the manufacturing process, it was possible to emboss the wrong number on a card, or use the wrong blank card to produce a credit card, he did not go so far as to suggest that either of those errors represented a realistic possibility. Further, his evidence that an “electronic use only” card should not have been embossed at all was effectively unchallenged. The trial judge’s reliance on Sgt. Koop’s evidence does not disclose any material misapprehension of evidence. [at para. 56]

3:40 Valuations

R. v. Singer, 2015 CarswellOnt 8676 (Ont. C.A.)

Crown Expert: Rudy Mulder

Defence Expert: Not identified

Singer was convicted for fraud over $5,000 and theft in relation to a renovation business he owned and operated. Singer’s victim was a 76-year-old woman who received the business’ brochure in the mail. Over several months she signed three contracts with the company worth over $320,000. She paid out over $300,000 to Singer. Shortly after the work had begun the victim’s health deteriorated and she was hospitalized. At the time of the hospitalization none of the work had been completed, what had been done was deficient and the house was uninhabitable. [at paras. 2-4]

Singer appealed the convictions. First, he argued that the Crown expert Rudy Mulder, should not have been qualified as an expert as he was an acquaintance of the complainant’s son. Second, he argued that the expert evidence did not establish a fraud but rather simply overcharging.

The Court of Appeal had no difficulty with the qualifications of Mr. Mulder. The Court held that:

the trial judge conducted a voir dire into Mr. Mulder’s evidence. He properly considered the witness’ education and experience and limited the scope of his expert testimony. He recognized that there were certain limitations in his experience that, depending on how he justified his opinion, were relevant to the weight of his evidence. The question of whether Mr. Mulder was impartial and independent was not pursued by defence counsel at the voir dire or in argument at trial. In all the circumstances, there was no error in the trial judge’s ruling permitting Mr. Mulder to testify as an expert witness and in the scope of the opinion he was permitted to provide. [at para. 14]

With respect to the ‘overcharge’ defence, the Court of Appeal had no difficulty with the trial judge finding that he:

was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt the overcharge was dishonest conduct by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people. On the expert evidence he accepted the overcharge was as high as $200,000. At a minimum, even accepting the appellant’s own figures, he overcharged by at least $85,000. As for intent, the trial judge noted that the appellant is an experienced home renovator and it is inconceivable that he did not know that the overall price of the three contracts was far greater than the market value of the work. [at para. 9]

R. v. Nguyen, 2014 CarswellBC 84 (B.C. S.C.)

Applicant Expert: David H. Foran

The Nguyens were convicted of criminal offences in relation to the grow-op they ran in a house Mr. Nguyen owed. The couple was sentenced to 18 months’ incarceration and the house was forfeited as offence related property. The Nguyens exhausted all avenues of appeal without success. Maple Trust held the first mortgage on the forfeited home and they applied for relief from the forfeiture order.

David H. Foran was qualified as an expert and permitted to give opinion evidence in the area of brokering residential mortgages, including NIQ mortgages. [at para. 35] Mr. Foran was called by Maple Trust to explain:

•    the credit report system used to determine the creditworthiness of a borrower;

•    the practice of the industry at the material type;

•    the fact that a person with Mr. Nguyen’s credit history and 25% down payment would have been approved for a mortgage;

•    that most institutions at that time did not require independent verification of income for NIQ mortgages;

•    having examined the documents in this case there was nothing that should have raised concerns for Maple Trust. [at paras. 36-39]

The Court accepted the evidence of Mr. Foran and held that there was nothing suspicious about the purchase. [at para. 98]. As such the court concluded that Maple Trust was entitled to relief from the forfeiture order. [at para. 102]

3:50 Proceeds of Crime and Money Laundering

R. v. Badran , 2017 CarswellOnt 6497 (Ont. C.A.)

Crown Expert: Det. Sgt. Currie

Badran was found guilty of fraud over $5,000, personating a police officer, transferring proceeds of crime, being a member of a criminal organization, instructing other to commit an indictable offence for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization, possession of property obtained by crime and committing an indictable offence for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization.

Badran appealed both his convictions and sentence. One of the grounds of appeal related to the expert evidence tendered at trial by the Crown. Badran submitted that the trial judge erred in admitting the expert evidence about proceeds of crime and money laundering. Specifically Badran argued that:

the trial judge erred in allowing Detective Sergeant Currie to give evidence as an expert witness. The appellant further submits that after telling the jury that she was not going to define “proceeds of crime” for the jury and that the expert witness’s evidence would assist the jury in understanding that term, the trial judge in effect did just that in her charge and the evidence of Detective Sergeant Currie was unnecessary. [at para. 4]

The Court of Appeal held that the:

trial judge applied the appropriate test for the admission of expert evidence and concluded that his evidence respecting proceeds of crime and money laundering would be helpful to the jury. The appellant takes issue with her conclusion. The analysis in R. v. Mohan, [1994] S.C.J. No. 36 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Abbey, [2009] O.J. No. 3534 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal refused, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 125 (S.C.C.)) necessarily reposes a good deal of confidence in the trial judge’s ability to discharge the gatekeeper function. The trial judge’s discharge of that gatekeeper function deserves a high degree of respect. [at para. 5]

Moreover, the Court found no error in the charge to the jury. Specifically, the Court held that:

The trial judge used the phrase “proceeds of crime” in her charge as a shorthand way to refer to the wording of the indictment in the count that the appellant “did transfer property, to wit money, knowing that it was obtained as a result of the commission in Canada of the designated offence of fraud over $5000.” Further, even if the expert evidence should not have been admitted, in the context of the overall trial, there was no prejudice to the appellant. [at para. 7]

The ground of appeal relating to the expert evidence was dismissed along with the other grounds raised by Badran.